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COUNTERCLAIMS AND STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS: A CRITICAL COMMENTARY
ON PRESENT TENNESSEE LAW
JOHN

L.

SOBIESKI, JR.*

Under rule 13 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendant is required in some cases, and permitted in all others,
to assert whatever claims he has against plaintiff as counterclaims in the same suit.' The rule also authorizes defendant to
request and receive any relief to which he is entitled on his counterclaim, even if his relief is different in kind or exceeds in
amount that sought by plaintiff. 2 Like its federal prototype, 3 however, rule 13 is silent as to whether defendant may assert his
counterclaims after the statute of limitations period applicable to
them has run.4 This question arises because the statutes setting
forth the limitations periods contain no indication that they were
intended to prohibit the assertion of otherwise untimely claims
asserted as counterclaims, and because a statute of limitations
*

B.S., Loyola University (Chicago); J.D., University of Michigan. Assistant Profes-

sor of Law, University of Tennessee. The author expresses his gratitude to Susan Callison
(B.A., Emory University; J.D., University of Tennessee) for her research and suggestions.
1. Rule 13.01 requires a party to assert
any claim, other than a tort claim, which at the time of serving the pleading
the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that a claim need not be stated as a counterclaim if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action. This rule shall not be construed as requiring a counterclaim to be filed in any court whose jurisdiction is limited either as to subject
matter or as to monetary amount so as to be unable to entertain such counterclaim.
TENN. R. Civ. P. 13.01. Rule 13.02 permits the assertion of any other claim a party has
against an opposing party.
The rule, it will be noted, does not speak in terms of defendants, but of parties
asserting claims against opposing parties. Thus, plaintiff may be required to assert compulsory counterclaims against defendant. However, typically defendant, not plaintiff, is
asserting counterclaims, and that situation is used as a model throughout this article. The
rule of law which is advocated herein, however, applies with equal force to plaintiffs
counterclaims.
2. Id. 13.03.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
4. To be distinguished is the question of whether the pleading itself setting forth the
counterclaim has been served and filed in timely fashion. These matters are governed by
the rules of procedure. See TENN. R. Civ. P. 5.05, 6.02, 12.01, 15.01.
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objection is a waivable affirmative defense.' Thus, the more precise question the courts have been called upon to resolve is
whether plaintiff, by instituting his action, thereby waives a statute of limitations defense to a counterclaim asserted by defendant after the limitations period on the counterclaim has run.6
The Tennessee cases addressing this question provide various answers7 which cannot be reconciled when viewed from the
perspective of the purposes served by statutes of limitations. Indeed, not one of the reported cases analyzes the question expressly in terms of those purposes. Instead, the current case law'
employs an analysis which improperly relies upon procedure at
common law. This approach often produces uncertain results-uncertainty capable of siring mischievous offspring. Alternatively, the common law approach may lead to results which
appear certain, but are rationally indefensible. The most recent
decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court addressing this problem, Lovejoy v. Ahearn," will serve as the focal point to illustrate
these propositions.
In Lovejoy plaintiff, Ahearn, commenced a negligence action
to recover for personal injury and property damage suffered in a
collision with a vehicle operated by Lloyd Lovejoy and owned by
James Lovejoy, a passenger. Both were named defendants.
Ahearn's action was commenced on the last day of the one-year
limitations period for personal injury actions. 10 Defendants answered, denying liability, and James Lovejoy filed a cross declaration, the ancestor of the present-day counterclaim, for property
damage. This initial cross declaration was filed within the threeyear limitations period applicable to injuries to personal property." Thereafter, both defendants filed cross declarations seeking recovery for their personal injuries. The trial court struck
5.
6.

Id. 8.03.
For a discussion of the federal cases, see 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1419 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
7. Compare Lovejoy v. Ahearn, 223 Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420 (1969); Stone v.
Duncan, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 102 (1858), with Lewis v. Turnley, 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) 197,
36 S.W. 872 (1896); Paducah & M.R.R. v. Parks, 86 Tenn. (2 Pickle) 553, 8 S.W. 842
(1888); Dunn v. Bell, 85 Tenn. (1 Pickle) 580, 4 S.W. 41 (1887), and Williams v. Lenoir,
67 Tenn. (8 Baxter) 395 (1875).
8. Lovejoy v. Ahearn, 223 Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420 (1969).
9. Id.
10. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp. 1974).
11. Id. § 28-305 (1955).
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these cross declarations on the ground that they were not filed
within the applicable one-year limitations period. On an interlocutory appeal the supreme court affirmed.
In deciding whether to permit adjudication of the Lovejoys'
untimely asserted personal injury claims, the supreme court
properly concluded that the statute pursuant to which the Lovejoys filed their cross declarations "in no way alludes to any statute of limitations."' 2 Finding no statutory language permitting
the assertion of untimely claims, the court then noted that the
statute's purpose in authorizing assertion of claims by defendant
was to avoid multiplicity of suits. Faced with nothing in the language or policy of the cross declaration statute which would compel adjudication of the untimely personal injury claims, the supreme court held that the cross declarations were properly
stricken, because "cross declarations in tort actions [were] unknown to the common law."' 3
Although the supreme court did not expressly discuss the
significance of the cross declaration statute's purpose of avoiding
a multiplicity of actions, it is correct to conclude that that purpose is wholly unaffected regardless of whether defendant's claim
is deemed barred by the statute of limitations." Also noticeably
absent from the Lovejoy opinion is any discussion of the reasons
for its holding in light of the purposes served by statutes of limitations. Consideration of those purposes demonstrates that they too
would not be frustrated by permitting adjudication of defendant's
claims which, like the Lovejoys', arise out of the transaction or
occurrence sued upon by plaintiff.
Generally speaking, statutes of limitations seek to provide
12. 223 Tenn. at 568, 448 S.W.2d at 422. The Tennessee Code under which the cross
declarations were filed provided:
In any action for tort where the defendant claims a cause of action, against the
suing plaintiffs, or any of them, growing out of the same act, accident or transaction (such, for example, as collision of vehicles), the defendant may, along with
his pleas and within the time limit allowed therefor, and in no case later than
the issue term, file a cross declaration setting forth his cause of action, upon his
executing a bond for costs, or otherwise complying with the law, in lieu thereof.
Code of 1932, § 8745 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1007 (1955) (repealed 1972)). The
phrase in the statute which states that defendant may file a cross declaration "within the
time limit allowed therefor" refers to the time in which the cross declaration itself must
be filed, not to the timeliness of assertion of the underlying claim for statute of limitations
purposes. See note 4 supra.
13. 223 Tenn. at 567, 448 S.W.2d at 422.
14. 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1419, at 109.
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repose by establishing a specified time beyond which an individual may not be sued for his past misdeeds, and to prevent the
assertion of claims which may be stale in terms of availability of
witnesses and other relevant evidence. By bringing his action,
however, plaintiff has made it abundantly clear that he does not
desire to lay to rest the transaction or occurrence upon which his
claim is founded. Adjudication of a claim of defendant based
upon the same transaction or occurrence would not entail inquiry
into wholly unrelated matters which plaintiff justifiably believed
were beyond reawakening. Similarly, if a transaction or occurrence is not so stale in terms of the availability of evidence as to
prevent litigation of plaintiff's claim, it would seem to follow that
the evidence would be equally available for purposes of adjudicating defendant's claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.
It is of course true that defendant can prevent operation of
the statute to bar his claim by commencing his own action within
the limitations period. But the failure of defendant to assert his
claim promptly in an independent action does not mean that his
claim lacks merit. Defendant's inaction may reflect merely an
uncounseled ignorance of the law or a sincere and honest intention to lay matters to rest, an intention not surprisingly altered
upon receipt of plaintiff's complaint. Thus, if none of the policies
served by statutes of limitations would be subverted by permitting adjudication of defendant's counterclaim, it seems unjust to
prohibit adjudication of a potentially meritorious counterclaim
on the ground that the statute of limitations has run.
The court in Lovejoy offered the proposition that "cross declarations in tort actions [were] unknown to the common law"' 5
as the only reason for its result. As an initial matter, the relevance
of this observation is not readily apparent, since the unavailability at common law of a procedural device by which the Lovejoys
15. Id. The term "common law" as used in Lovejoy does not appear to be aimed at
drawing a distinction between law as opposed to equity courts. An examination of cases
decided prior to Lovejoy reveals that the type of court in which the action proceeded has
not been deemed a relevant consideration for purposes of determining whether defendant
may assert claims after the limitations period has run. Compare Lovejoy v. Ahearn, 223
Tenn. 562, 448 S.W.2d 420 (1969) (circuit court; untimely claim not permitted), and Lewis
v. Turnley, 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) 197, 36 S.W. 872 (1896) (chancery court; untimely claim
permitted), with Paducah & M.R.R. v.'
Parks, 86 Tenn. (2 Pickle) 554, 8 S.W. 842 (1888)
(circuit court; untimely claim permitted), and Stone v. Duncan, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 102
(1858) (chancery court; untimely claim not permitted).
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could assert their claims is quite distinct from the question of
whether defendant's counterclaims may be asserted after the expiration of the limitations period. Lewis v. Turnley'" illustrates
this distinction.
Lewis involved the sale of land which contained valuable
improvements. Defendant vendee gave a note for a one-half undivided interest in the land. The administrator of the vendor's estate brought suit to recover a balance of approximately $500 due
on the note. Although admitting his indebtedness," the vendee
affirmatively alleged that the vendor agreed, as part of the inducement to contract, to transfer to the vendee $1600 worth of
insurance on the improvements or to be bound for that amount
of insurance. Before the insurance could be transferred, the improvements were destroyed by fire. Accordingly, defendant
sought to recover $800, one-half of the insurance coverage, against
plaintiff's claim on the note. Plaintiff in turn argued that at the
time defendant asserted his claim, the statute of limitations had
run, thus barring his recovery. The supreme court held, however,
that while the statute had run, defendant would be permitted to
recover the difference between the amount of insurance coverage
8
and the balance due on defendant's note.'
The court in Lewis noted initially that the governing provision of the Tennessee Code permitted assertion of defendant's
claim.' 9 The court then suggested that it would be the "'highest
injustice' "20 to allow plaintiff to recover on defendant's note while
denying defendant the insurance money owed to him. After citing
with approval its earlier decision in Williams v. Lenoir2 for the
proposition that "upon a proper plea of set-off the statute of
limitations will not operate as a bar against defendant's claims,
16. 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) 197, 36 S.W. 872 (1896). See also Paducah & M.R.R. v.
Parks, 86 Tenn. (2 Pickle) 553, 8 S.W. 842 (1888); Williams v. Lenoir, 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter)
395 (1875); Wood v. Cannon County, 25 Tenn. App. 600, 166 S.W.2d 399 (1942); A.
C.&THas, HISTORY OF A LAWSUrr § 242, at 289 (8th ed. S. Gilreath & B. Aderholt 1963).
17. Curiously, if defendant proved that plaintiff's claim was without merit, setoff
was not permitted. East Tenn. & Va. R.R. v. Galbraith, 48 Tenn. (1 Heiskell) 482 (1870);
Martin v. M'Alister, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerger) 111 (1825); see also text accompanying note 36
infra.
18. 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) at 205, 36 S.W. at 874.
19. Id. at 202-03, 36 S.W. at 873.
20. Id. at 204, 36 S.W. at 873, quoting Ord v. Ruspini, 170 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1797)
(Lord Kenyon, J.).
21. 67 Tenn. (8 Baxter) 395 (1875).
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nor run at all after the commencement of plaintiff's suit, in cases
of mutual accounts arising between the parties about the same
time, 1 2 the court held that "the set-off pleaded in this case, being
evolved from the original consideration, is not barred, for the
reason that the principal claim sought to be enforced is not barred
''23

By parity of reasoning, it would seem to have followed that
defendants' personal injury claims should have been entertained
in Lovejoy. As in Lewis, the Tennessee Code in effect at the time
Lovejoy was decided unequivocally permitted assertion of defendants' claims 24 and authorized relief in excess of that sought
by plaintiff. 5 Moreover, the reasoning in Lewis that defendant
could assert his untimely claim because the principal claim is not
barred applies with equal force to the Lovejoys' claims. Even if
Lewis is read as holding only that the statute is tolled when
plaintiff commences his action, the Lovejoys' claims should have
been considered timely since on the day Ahearn commenced his
action the statute of limitations had not yet run on them. Finally,
while the facts in Lewis required the court to refer to defendant's
claim in contract terms as one which evolved from the original
consideration, the only limitation this language should be construed to impose is that defendant's claim must bear some" 'relation to the principal claim.' ",26 While the nexus between defendant's and plaintiff's claims in Lewis arguably is more apparent
22. 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) at 204, 36 S.W. at 873-74.
23. Id. at 205, 36 S.W. at 874.
24. See note 12 supra. The repeal of the section of the Code under which the Lovejoys asserted their claims does not appear to have any significance for this discussion. That
section was repealed along with numerous other sections of the Tennessee Code Annotated
which were superseded by or inconsistent with the current Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The repealing legislation thus seems to have been intended as a house-cleaning
measure, and not as an expression of legislative disapproval of the judicial construction
of the repealed provisions.
25. The controlling section of the Tennessee Code Annotated provided: "[Ihf the
cross plaintiff's damages or established demand exceed those of the plaintiff, he shall be
awarded judgment for the excess .... " Code of 1932, § 8749 (codified at Tenn. Code
Ann. § 20-1011 (1955) (repealed 1972)).
26. 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) at 204, 36 S.W. at 873, quoting 2 H. WooD, LIMITATION OF
AcTIONS § 281, at 723 (1893). If defendant's claim arises out of a different transaction or
occurrence than that being sued upon, commencement of plaintiff's action does not toll
the statute on defendant's claim. Wood v. Cannon County, 25 Tenn. App. 600, 166 S.W.2d
399 (1942). Similarly, if defendant fails to assert his claim, he may not commence a
subsequent independent action after the limitations period has run. Mann v. Smith, 158
Tenn. 463, 14 S.W.2d 722 (1929).
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than that in Lovejoy, still the Lovejoys' claims had a sufficient
relation to Ahearn's in the sense that they arose out of the same
occurrence upon which the latter was suing.
Nonetheless, as indicated earlier, the court in Lovejoy refused to permit adjudication of defendants' personal injury
claims because, according to the court, the common law did not
recognize cross declarations in tort actions. This approach is
rather startling since the court in Lewis never discussed the question of whether defendant in that case could have asserted his
claim at common law. It was sufficient for the Lewis court that
the Tennessee Code authorized assertion of defendant's claim
and that it would constitute the " 'highest injustice' " not to permit its adjudication. Since, however, Lovejoy did bottom its holding on the types of claims assertable by defendant at common
law, it is essential to examine that law in order to ascertain how
the Lovejoys' cross declarations differed from those which could
be asserted at common law, and thus to understand the present
state of the law in Tennessee.
Recoupment and setoff were doctrines developed at common
law" based on the commonsense notion that defendant "should
not be compelled to pay one moment what he will be entitled to
recover back the next."2 " Recoupment was available regardless of
9
the liquidated or unliquidated character of defendant's claim.
Recoupment at common law could be utilized, however, only for
the purpose of defeating plaintiff's claim; defendant could not
27. Historically, setoff was a doctrine initially developed in equity. See generally C.
CLARK, THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 100, at 635 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited-as
CLARK]; J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, COMMON LAW PLEADINGS § 278, at 516 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as KOFFLER & REPPY]. The doctrine of setoff was made applicable in common law
courts by statute in England and is considered part of the common law in Tennessee. Flint
v. Tillman, 49 Tenn. (2 Heiskell) 202 (1870); see also KoFFLER & REPPY § 278, at 516.
A note of caution is in order concerning the statements in the text setting forth the
common law. The cases themselves do not at all times appear to utilize a consistent
definition of the term "common law," and the decisions are not entirely consistent. The
generalizations in the text represent what appears to be the weight of, or the better,
authority. This difficulty in ascertaining the common law is itself a basis upon which
Lovejoy is subject to criticism. Moreover, even if the common law can be ascertained, its
application is not without difficulty.
28. J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CnVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATEmIALS
505 (2d ed. 1974).
29. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. Co., 153 Tenn. 260, 283 S.W. 448 (1926); Pettee
v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 380 (1853); C.B. Voncannon & Co. v. Burleson
& Laws, 6 Tenn. App. 369 (1927).
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invoke recoupment to recover relief in excess of that demanded
by plaintiff. 0 Moreover, recoupment was available only if "the
claims of plaintiff and defendant involve the same 'subject matter,' or arise out of the 'same transaction.' ",31 Unlike recoupment,
setoff allowed defendant to recover a balance 2 and to assert
claims in certain circumstances which arose out of a different
transaction than that sued upon.3 Setoff was unavailable for un3
liquidated claims, however.

Two additional observations concerning common law setoff
and recoupment are pertinent. Both doctrines, at least in terms
of the Tennessee decisions, appear to have been invoked only in
cases where plaintiff sued in debt or contract for money damages. 3 5 Moreover, common law recoupment is generally considered to be a species of defense available only if plaintiff has a
valid claim against defendant. If, however, "the cross claims are
totally destructive of each other so that only plaintiff or only
defendant can prevail, neither claim could possibly go in reduc30. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. Co., 153 Tenn. 260, 283 S.W. 448 (1926); Overton
v. Phelan, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 445 (1859); Hogg & Belcher v. Cardwell, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed)
150 (1856); Pettee v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 380 (1853); Porter v. Woods,
Stacker & Co., 22 Tenn. (3 Humphreys) 56 (1842).
31. CIAm § 100, at 635. See also Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. Co., 153 Tenn. 260,
283 S.W. 448 (1926); Arco Co. v. Garner & Co., 143 Tenn. 262, 227 S.W. 1025 (1920);
Scatchard v. Barge, 102 Tenn. (18 Pickle) 242, 52 S.W. 153 (1899); Brady v. Wasson, 53
Tenn. (6 Heiskell) 131 (1871); Hulme v. Brown, 50 Tenn. (3 Heiskell) 679 (1870); Hogg &
Belcher v. Cardwell, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 150 (1856); Wood v. Cannon County, 25 Tenn.
App. 600, 166 S.W.2d 399 (1942); C.B. Voncannon & Co. v. Burleson & Laws, 6 Tenn.
App. 369 (1927).
32. Lewis v. Turnley, 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) 197 (1896); Williams v. Lenoir, 67 Tenn.
(8 Baxter) 395 (1875); East Tenn. & Va. R.R. v. Galbraith, 48 Tenn. (1 Heiskell) 482
(1870); McClain v. Kincaid, 13 Tenn. (5 Yerger) 232 (1833); McKernon & Demoss v. Hall,
9 Tenn. (1 Yerger) 397 (1830); KoFmLER & REPPY § 278, at 517.
33. Arco Co. v. Garner & Co., 143 Tenn. 262, 227 S.W. 1025 (1920); Scatchard v.
Barge, 102 Tenn. (18 Pickle) 242, 52 S.W. 153 (1899); Paducah & M.R.R. v. Parks, 86
Tenn. (2 Pickle) 553, 8 S.W. 242 (1888); Brady v. Wasson, 53 Tenn (6 Heiskell) 131 (1871);
Memphis & Little Rock R.R. v. Walker, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 467 (1859); Wood v. Cannon
County, 25 Tenn. App. 600, 166 S.W.2d 399 (1942).
34. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. Co., 153 Tenn. 260, 283 S.W. 448 (1925); Arco Co.
v. Garner & Co., 143 Tenn. 262, 227 S.W. 1025 (1920); Harris v. Harris, 3 Shannon 57
(Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1878); Brady v. Wasson, 53 Tenn. (6 Heiskell) 131 (1871); Martin v.
M'Alister, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerger) 111 (1825).
35. See generally A. C~AurHxsS, HisTORY OF A LAwsurr § 242 (8th ed. S. Gilreath &
B. Aderholt 1963). If plaintiff sought repossession of an item of property, setoff and
recoupment were unavailable to defendant. Julian Eng'r Co. v. R.J. & C.W. Fletcher Inc.,
194 Tenn. 542, 253 S.W.2d 743 (1952); Blair v. A. Johnson & Sons, 111 Tenn. 111, 76 S.W.
912 (1903).
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tion of the other, and the notion of recoupment is altogether
inapplicable. '"36
The cross declarations of the Lovejoys seeking recovery for
their personal injuries represented a departure from the common
law in several respects. Because of the unliquidated character of
the Lovejoys' claims, recoupment would have been the only common law doctrine available for their assertion. But recoupment
would probably not have been permitted for two distinct reasons.
First, considering the substantive law governing the case, defendants' claims could prevail only if plaintiff's claim failed.
Ahearn based his claim on a negligence theory. In Tennessee,
plaintiff's contributory negligence is a total bar to his recovery in
negligence. 37 Thus, the same alleged negligent conduct which
would have given rise to recovery on the Lovejoys' cross declarations also would have constituted a complete defense to Ahearn's
recovery in negligence. Recoupment was probably unavailable for
the additional reason that Ahearn sued on an unliquidated tort
claim, not in debt or contract. Moreover, even if recoupment was
available, defendant at common law could utilize recoupment
only for the limited purpose of netting-out plaintiff's claim. The
Tennessee Code authorizing assertion of the Lovejoys' claims,
however, permitted defendant to recover any amount to which he
was entitled on his unliquidated claims, even if his relief exceeded
38
that demanded by plaintiff.
The court in Lovejoy did not delineate which of the several
differences between the common law and the cross declarations
asserted by the Lovejoys it deemed controlling. As a result, two
constructions can be placed on the court's opinion. On the one
hand, Lovejoy can be read broadly as precluding defendant from
asserting any untimely claim, at least where plaintiff sues on an
unliquidated tort claim, since both recoupment and setoff appear
to have been available only where plaintiff sued in debt or contract.3 9 On the other hand, Lovejoy may be construed more nar36. F. JAMES, JR., CIVL PROCEDURE § 10.17, at 488 (1965). This same concept is
expressed in East Tenn. & Va. R.R. v. Galbraith, 48 Tenn. (1 Heiskell) 482 (1870).
37. For a comprehensive discussion of this rule of law and a proposal for its modification, see Wade, Crawford & Ryder, Comparative Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past,
Present and Future, 41 .TENN. L. REv. 423 (1974).
38. See note 25 supra.
39. At least one commentator appears to have so read the case. Phillips, Civil
Procedureand Evidence-Tennessee Survey 1970, 38 TENN. L. REV. 127, 138-39 (1971);
see also Maxwell v. Roark, 337 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (Lovejoy controlling in
federal diversity action).
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rowly only as preventing defendant from recovering relief in excess of that demanded by plaintiff where defendant asserts his
unliquidated claim after the limitations period has run. Under
this narrow reading, defendant could assert his untimely claims
for the purpose of netting-out plaintiff's recovery.
The uncertainty surrounding Lovejoy is unfortunate, because situations can easily be posited in which the outcome of a
particular case will hinge upon its precise holding. For example,
assume that immediately following the collision, Ahearn assaulted the Lovejoys. If the court in Lovejoy intended only to
prevent affirmative recovery on defendants' unliquidated claims,
then the -defendants' assault claims could be asserted to net-out
plaintiff's recovery. But if, on the other hand, defendant may not
assert his untimely claims for any purpose where plaintiff is suing
on an unliquidated tort claim, then defendants would not be
permitted to assert their claims even for the limited purpose of
diminishing or defeating plaintiff's recovery.
If a choice between these interpretations must be made, it
seems preferable to read Lovejoy as permitting assertion of unliquidated claims in order to net-out plaintiff's recovery. This
preference becomes at once evident upon examining the harmful
consequences which might result from reading Lovejoy as prohibiting defendant from asserting any untimely claim where plaintiff
sues on an unliquidated tort claim.
In the first place, this latter interpretation of Lovejoy may
well foment needless litigation. An attorney counseling a client
against whom an even arguably meritorious unliquidated tort
claim may be asserted must give serious thought to commencing
an action if for no other reason than the possibility that the other
party might bring a lawsuit at the end of the limitations period
when it will be impossible to assert his client's claims in timely
fashion. This result certainly seems at odds with the wellconsidered public policy of discouraging litigation.
More importantly, this interpretation of Lovejoy lends itself
to conscious manipulation in the hands of unscrupulous attorneys. Can it be said with positive assurance that no attorney
would delay bringing a lawsuit solely to prevent timely assertion
of defendant's claim? Scrupulous attorneys, too, may be confronted with serious ethical questions. May an attorney ethically
delay filing his client's claim knowing that a meritorious counterclaim cannot be timely asserted? To ask this question is not to
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imply that the only reason an attorney would delay filing his
client's claim would be to prevent timely assertion of defendant's
claim, although that possibility clearly exists. For example, in a
personal injury case like Lovejoy, an attorney might wait to
commence an action until the end of the limitations period for the
legitimate purpose of being fully informed concerning the extent
of his client's injuries. Whatever the reason for delay, however,
the effect of delaying suit cannot be ignored.
Furthermore, other ethical questions may arise as a result of
broadly interpreting Lovejoy as prohibiting the assertion of all
untimely claims by defendant if plaintiff sues on an unliquidated
tort claim. Because the statute of limitations defense is waivable, 4" should plaintiff's attorney urge his client not to raise the
defense if a claim is filed such that defendant cannot assert his
counterclaim in timely fashion?41 Is an attorney under an ethical
obligation at least to advise his adversary well in advance of his
intention to commence an action so that the adversary may protect his client's interests by asserting his claim in a timely independent action? Such an ethical obligation would be impossible
to discharge if the limitations period on defendant's claim is
shorter than plaintiff's, and if plaintiff consults an attorney after
the time has run on defendant's claim. Notice to the adversary
is thus at best a partial solution. Moreover, it is questionable
whether any such ethical obligation could be effectively enforced.
Finally, the harsh results prompted by the broad interpretation of Lovejoy invite disrespect for the law by those caught in
its snare. The different periods provided in the various statutes
of limitations are, after all, somewhat arbitrary if compared with
one another; this arbitrariness is highlighted when different limitations periods govern different claims which arise from the same
factual setting. Moreover, all limitations periods are arbitrary at
their cutting edge. This is not to suggest that statutes of limitations do not promote legitimate goals. But why may the injured
owner of a vehicle like James Lovejoy recover for his broken headlights, but not his broken bones? Why is a counterclaim involving
the same transaction or occurrence sued 6pon by plaintiff untimely if asserted one day after plaintiff's complaint is filed?
40.
41.

TENN. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
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These serious consequences certainly counsel that Lovejoy be
read only as prohibiting affirmative relief on unliquidated claims
asserted by defendant after the limitations period has run. A far
more satisfactory result may be achieved, however, if the Lovejoy
approach of delving into the oftentimes murky common law is
abandoned completely. In its stead, a rule of law should be
adopted which permits defendant to assert his untimely claims
for whatever relief to which he is entitled, so long as the claims
arise out of the transaction or occurrence being sued upon by
plaintiff. Translating this rule of law into the language of rule 13
of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 defendant should be
permitted to assert untimely compulsory counterclaims. By definition a compulsory counterclaim under rule 13.01 is one, other
than a tort claim, which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiffs claim. In addition,
defendants in Tennessee should be permitted to assert untimely
permissive tort counterclaims which arise from the transaction or
occurrence being sued upon by plaintiff.
This rule would be more favorable to defendants than the
approach adopted in the prior Tennessee decisions like Lewis and
Williams, which permitted assertion of untimely claims properly
the subject of setoff. Those cases, it will be recalled, required that
defendant's claim be timely at commencement of plaintiff's action. 3 The Lewis approach has been designated as the tolling
theory; the rule of law suggested here embraces a waiver theory.
If plaintiff's claim and defendant's counterclaim are governed by the same limitations period, the result is identical regardless of whether the tolling theory or the waiver theory is
adopted. However, if the limitations period on plaintiff's claim is
longer than that for defendant's counterclaim, different results
may obtain depending on the facts and theory embraced. Once
again, if plaintiff commences his action within the shorter limitations period provided for defendant's counterclaim, both the
waiver and tolling theories reach identical results. But if plaintiff's action is commenced within the time provided for his claim
but after the shorter period provided for defendant's counterclaim has run, significantly different results ensue. Under the
tolling theory, defendant's counterclaim would be deemed un42.
43.

See note 1 supra.
See cases cited in note 15 supra.
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timely, because at the time the statute of limitations was
tolled-that is, when plaintiff commenced his action-the counterclaim was already barred. On the other hand, if plaintiff is
deemed to have waived the statute of limitations defense, defendant could assert his counterclaim even if it were otherwise
barred at the time plaintiff commenced his action.
The policies underlying statutes of limitations are not frustrated if defendant is permitted to assert at any time beyond the
limitations period his counterclaims which arise out of the transaction or occurrence sued upon. By bringing the action, plaintiff
has indicated no desire for repose, and if evidence is available for
plaintiff's claim it would seem to be equally available for defendant's counterclaim. Moreover, all the undesirable results
which follow from interpreting Lovejoy as prohibiting assertion of
all untimely claims also ensue if commencement of plaintiff's
action merely tolls the statute of limitations where the limitations
period is shorter for defendant's counterclaim. The plaintiff could
simply sit back and wait to commence his action until the time
for assertion of defendant's counterclaim has expired. A waiver
approach, therefore, deals more satisfactorily with the problem at
hand.
Finally, if it is conceded that commencement of plaintiff's
action should be treated as a waiver of the statute of limitations,
it is difficult to perceive why defendant should not be permitted
recovery on his counterclaim in excess of that demanded by plaintiff as authorized by rule 13.03. 44 The policies of the statutes of
limitations are unrelated to the amount or kind of recovery; those
policies reach only the question of the timeliness of assertion of
the claim. The Tennessee cases which permitted untimely setoffs
for relief in excess of that sought by plaintiff implicitly reflect this
notion.
The law in Tennessee concerning the effect that initiation of
plaintiff's action has on defendant's ability to assert his counterclaims after the limitations period has run is in need of
clarification or, better still, revision. The Lovejoy common law
analysis is both ambiguous and seemingly incapable of reasoned
44. At least some of the courts which permit assertion of untimely counterclaims
nonetheless limit defendant to defeating plaintiff's recovery and do not permit affirmative
relief. See the discussion in 6 WmGHT & MIaupE § 1419, at 110; see also Caldwell v. Powell,
65 Tenn. (6 Baxter) 82 (1873).
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defense in light of prior law and the policies served by statutes of
limitations. Moreover, the tolling theory presently followed by
the Tennessee decisions in cases involving claims properly the
subject of common law setoff should be modified to permit assertion of any untimely counterclaim for any relief to which defendant is entitled, so long as it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence being sued upon by plaintiff. These two changes in the
present law would result in a more just procedural jurisprudence
in Tennessee.

